Singapore’s Housing Crisis: Can HDB Sustain Its Legacy?

Singapore’s public housing system, masterminded by the Housing & Development Board (HDB), has long been heralded as a triumph of urban policy. Since its inception in 1960, it has lifted a nation from the depths of an overcrowding crisis to achieve a staggering homeownership rate exceeding 90%, a figure that sets it apart on the global stage. This success stems from a carefully crafted model of subsidized flats, a lottery-based Build-to-Order (BTO) allocation system, and government-backed loans tied to a mandatory savings scheme. For decades, it has offered young Singaporeans a foothold on the property ladder, delivering well-maintained homes that defy the stereotypes of dilapidated public housing seen elsewhere. Yet, as of March 2025, this celebrated system is buckling under the weight of an overheated market, raising a pressing question: can it sustain its legacy, or is it veering toward a crisis of its own making?

The roots of this strain lie in the system’s own achievements. The BTO process, designed to fairly distribute new flats, has become a bottleneck as demand outstrips supply. With Singapore’s population swelling to over 6 million—up by half a million citizens since 2007—competition for flats has intensified. Applicants face wait times of three to five years, and some, like 33-year-old Ganesh Raj Kumaraguru and his fiancée, endure multiple failed ballots before securing a unit. Even then, their S$700,000 flat won’t be ready until 2028. The Covid-19 pandemic compounded these delays, driving construction costs up by nearly 30% and forcing the government to absorb a S$6.7 billion deficit in the financial year ending March 2024 to maintain subsidies. This financial burden, while a testament to commitment, underscores the growing difficulty of keeping pace with demand.

The government is not standing idly by. In a February 2025 speech, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong pledged to build enough housing for every Singaporean household, unveiling plans for 50,000 new flats over the next three years, including 19,600 in 2025 alone. Of these, 3,800 promise wait times under three years, a direct response to public frustration. Budget 2025 also bolstered support, raising grants for lower-income families under the Fresh Start Housing Scheme to S$75,000 from S$50,000. To cool the resale market, measures like reducing the loan-to-value ratio for resale flats to 75% and doubling minimum occupation periods for prime locations have been rolled out, alongside partial clawbacks on subsidies for high-value resales. These steps signal a robust intent to restore balance.

Singapore’s housing system is a victim of its own brilliance—a model so effective it has bred expectations that now strain its limits. To reclaim its promise, bold reform is non-negotiable. First, the government must double down on cooling measures, introducing a progressive tax on resale profits exceeding a certain threshold, say 50%, to deter speculation while channeling funds back into subsidies. Extending minimum occupation periods across all flats, not just prime ones, would further anchor the system in its social mission. These steps would send a clear message: HDB flats are for living, not flipping.

I firmly believe Singapore’s public housing system is at a tipping point. The data—50% resale price hikes, million-dollar flats, a S$6.7 billion deficit—paints a picture of a model stretched beyond its original design. Neutrality here is not an option; the evidence demands action. The government’s current measures are a start, but they tinker at the edges of a structural shift. Without aggressive intervention to curb speculation and rethink eligibility, the system risks becoming a stratified market where only the lucky or wealthy thrive. This would betray the social contract that has underpinned Singapore’s stability for over six decades.

​Singapore’s housing saga offers lessons and warnings. Its ability to deliver affordable homes amid scarcity is remarkable, yet its current trajectory threatens to unravel that legacy. For policymakers, the priority is clear: prioritize supply, tax speculation, and modernize eligibility—half-measures won’t suffice. For residents, navigating this market means staying strategic—opt for BTO flats in less hyped areas, explore balance flats with shorter waits, or consider renting as a bridge. The system can endure, but only with decisive action. Its future hinges on whether Singapore can tame the market it mastered, ensuring housing remains a right, not a privilege.